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Abstract
While social media has become an empowering agent to in-
dividual voices and freedom of expression, it also facilitates
anti-social behaviors including online harassment, cyberbul-
lying, and hate speech. In this paper, we present the first
comparative study of hate speech instigators and target users
on Twitter. Through a multi-step classification process, we
curate a comprehensive hate speech dataset capturing var-
ious types of hate. We study the distinctive characteristics
of hate instigators and targets in terms of their profile self-
presentation, activities, and online visibility. We find that hate
instigators target more popular and high profile Twitter users,
and that participating in hate speech can result in greater on-
line visibility. We conduct a personality analysis of hate insti-
gators and targets and show that both groups have eccentric
personality facets that differ from the general Twitter popula-
tion. Our results advance the state of the art of understanding
online hate speech engagement.
Introduction
Social media has become a ubiquitous, powerful communi-
cation tool. However, while it has enabled rich, quick infor-
mation sharing and conversation, it has also facilitated anti-
social behavior including online harassment, trolling, cyber-
bullying, and hate speech. In a Pew Research Center study1,
60% of Internet users had witnessed offensive name calling,
25% had seen someone physically threatened, and 24% wit-
nessed sustained harassment of an individual.
In this paper, we focus on speech that denigrates a per-
son because of their innate and protected characteristics,
which is also known as hate speech. While there is no
consensus on the definition of hate speech, prior work has
shown that people are primarily bullied for their perceived
or actual ethnicity, behavior, physical characteristics, sex-
ual orientation, class or gender (Silva et al. 2016). Target-
ing a community or individual because of their immutable
or prominent characteristics slowly eradicates feelings of
safety and security (Hamm 1994; Levin and MacDevitt
2013). Prior studies have focused on online hate speech
detection (Schmidt and Wiegand 2017) and characteriza-
tion, e.g., effect of banning hate speech (Chandrasekha-
ran et al. 2017); on-the-ground events that are triggered
Copyright c© 2018, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
1http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/10/22/online-harassment/
by hate speech (Williams and Burnap 2015; Wired 2016;
Benesch 2014); and semi-organized raids by instigators to
cripple hate speech detection technology (Hine et al. 2017).
Despite this work, little is known about online hate speech
actors, including hate speech instigators and targets.
We present the first comparative study of online hate
speech instigators and targets. We curate a dataset of 27,330
hate speech Twitter tweets and extract 25,278 instigator and
22,287 target accounts. Prior work has presented evidence
that social media can be used to obtain valuable data that
incorporates facets of the virtual and physical worlds of bul-
lying (Xu et al. 2012). We choose Twitter because it pro-
vides a platform for open discourse and a cross-section of
the general public, with 328 million monthly active users in
2017 (Statista 2017). Our work seeks to answer the follow-
ing research questions:
RQ1: How do hate instigator and target account character-
istics and online visibility differ from each other and from
generic Twitter account holders?
RQ2: Are there key personality differences between hate
speech instigators, targets and general Twitter users?
Due to the lack of public hate speech datasets that include
labeled roles of instigators and targets, we curate our own
dataset for what we coin “Peer to peer” hate speech. This
paper presents the following contributions:
• We present the first comparison of hate instigators, tar-
gets and general Twitter users in terms of profile self-
presentation, Twitter visibility, and personality traits.
• We provide a compressed lexicon of Hatebase (the
world’s largest hate expression repository) for hate speech
researchers, comprised of 51 terms likely to result in hate
speech content across eight different hate classes. We out-
line a method of semi-automated classification that could
be used for directed explicit hate speech data curation. We
curate a dataset of 27,330 hate speech tweets, which we
make publicly available for other researchers.2
• We examine the visibility of Twitter users through multi-
variant regression models and controlling for variables
that can impact visibility measures.
2The lexicon and the dataset are available here: https://
github.com/mayelsherif/hate_speech_icwsm18
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Our study yields multiple important findings. First, hate
targets often have older accounts while instigators often have
younger accounts. Compared to general users, both instiga-
tors and targets are more active in terms of becoming friends
with others, posting tweets, and populating profile content.
Targets include 60% and 40% more verified accounts than
instigators and general users, respectively. Even when con-
trolling for variables that can impact visibility measures, we
find that higher visibility and participation in hate are cor-
related. More visible Twitter users (with more followers,
retweets and lists) are more likely to become targets of hate.
Finally, instigators and targets share some personality traits
such as suspiciousness, low emotional awareness, and high
anger and immoderation, which differ from personality traits
of the general Twitter user population.
Related Work
Anti-social behavior. In 1997, the use of machine learning
was proposed to detect classes of abusive messages (Sper-
tus 1997). Cyberbullying has been studied on numerous so-
cial media platforms, e.g., Twitter (Silva et al. 2016) and
YouTube (Dinakar et al. 2012). Other work has focused on
detecting personal insults and offensive language (Burnap
and Williams 2014).
Hate speech characterization. The characterization and
correlation of hate speech with contributing factors has
recently received attention. Factors include on-the-ground
“trigger” events, e.g., terrorist attacks (Williams and Burnap
2015), crime (Wired 2016), and news (Hine et al. 2017).
Most closely related to our work are (Chatzakou et al.
2017b; Chatzakou et al. 2017a; Cheng et al. 2017; Silva et al.
2016; Waseem and Hovy 2016). Chatzakou et al. (Chatza-
kou et al. 2017a) study the users of tweets with the #Gamer-
gate hashtag. Similar to our results, they found that these
users tend to have more friends and followers, and are
generally more engaged than random users. Chatzakou et
al. (Chatzakou et al. 2017b) study the properties of bullies
and aggressors and employ supervised machine learning to
classify Twitter users into four classes: bully, aggressive,
spam, and normal. In contrast to their dataset, our dataset
is more diverse and not biased towards specific types of hate
speech. Moreover, we compare the characteristics of hate in-
stigators and the targets of hate from multiple perspectives
and show that, even when controlling for features that cap-
ture the activity level of the users, both hate instigator and
target users are more likely to get attention on Twitter, i.e.,
they obtain more followers, are retweeted and listed more.
Alternatively, Cheng et al. find that prior negative mood
and the context of the discussion can combine to dou-
ble participants’ baseline engagement in trolling behavior.
While the authors only used sentiment analysis to investi-
gate mood, we incorporate a full analysis of the Big Five
personality traits. In addition, we study the personality traits
of both instigators and targets and compare results to a ran-
dom sample of general Twitter users. Silva et al. (Silva et al.
2016) identified hate target groups in terms of their class and
ethnicity on Twitter and Whisper by searching for sentence
structures similar to “I<intensity> hate<targeted group>.”
However, we identify the actual accounts of hate targets on
Twitter, i.e., those that are explicitly mentioned by hate in-
stigators. Therefore, our analysis provides a unique lens to
analyze characteristics of target accounts.
Preliminaries
Waseem et al. outline a typology of abuse language that dif-
ferentiates between language directed towards a specific in-
dividual or entity (Directed) versus a general group of indi-
viduals who share a common characteristic, e.g., ethnicity or
sexual orientation (Generalized) (Waseem et al. 2017). An-
other dimension is whether the abusive language is explicit,
e.g., contains racial, sexist or homophobic slurs, or implicit,
which is harder to determine without adding contextual vari-
ables to the content. In this work, we study instances of di-
rected hate speech that occur between two Twitter accounts.
We define the following entities:
• A hate tweet is an explicit directed tweet that contains
one or more hate speech terms used against a Twitter
account holder. An example from our dataset is: “@usr
n*gger f*ck u igger n*gger n*gger n*gger.”3 This tweet
is explicit because of the word “n*gger;” it is directed be-
cause it targets a specific account (@usr).4
• A hate instigator (HI) is a Twitter account that posts one
or more hate tweets.
• A hate target (HT) is a Twitter account targeted by a
hate tweet and explicitly mentioned in the tweet using the
mention sign (@), e.g., usr in our example. We note that
role labels are not mutually exclusive in our dataset; a HI
account may be a HT in another hate tweet.
Data and Methods
Despite the existence of a body of work dedicated to de-
tecting hate speech (Schmidt and Wiegand 2017), accurate
hate speech detection is still extremely challenging (Tech
2016). A key problem is the lack of a commonly accepted
benchmark corpus for the task. Each classifier is tested on a
corpus of labeled comments ranging from a hundred to sev-
eral thousand. Another option for collecting a dataset is fil-
tering comments based on hate terms and annotating them.
This is challenging because (i) annotation is time consum-
ing and the percentage of hate tweets is very small relative
to the total; and (ii) there is no consensus on the definition
of hate speech (Sellars 2016). Some work has distinguished
between profanity, insults and hate speech (Davidson et al.
2017), while other work has considered any insult based on
the intrinsic characteristics of the person (e.g. ethnicity, sex-
ual orientation, gender) to be hate speech related (Warner
and Hirschberg 2012).
This annotation process can become even harder for role
labeling, i.e., annotating actors as instigators, targets, by-
standers (Xu et al. 2012; Faris et al. 2016). This is partic-
ularly challenging for social networking APIs that do not
provide the whole thread of the conversation but only a
random sample of comments, as in the case of the Twitter
3We replace select vowels with the star (*) character in obscene
language.
4We anonymize all user mentions by replacing them with @usr.
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Figure 1: Flowchart of the filtering process used to obtain
our dataset.
Streaming API. In this work, we adopt a definition of hate
speech inspired by Facebook’s community standards (Face-
book 2016) and Twitter’s hateful conduct policy (Twitter
2016) as “direct and serious attacks on any protected cate-
gory of people based on their race, ethnicity, national origin,
religion, sex, gender, sexual orientation, disability or dis-
ease.” To mitigate the aforementioned challenges, we collect
our own explicit Twitter hate speech dataset. We describe
our semi-automated detection approach for directed explicit
hate speech in the following subsections.
Data Collection
(1) Key phrase-based dataset (HS-1%): We adopt a multi-
step classification approach. First, we use Twitter’s Stream-
ing API5 to procure a 1% sample of Twitter’s public stream
from January 1st, 2016 to July 31st, 2017. We began by in-
specting hate speech keyphrases in the Hatebase repository6,
the world’s largest online repository of structured, multilin-
gual, usage-based hate speech7. Online users can contribute
to Hatebase by adding new derogatory words or phrases,
their meaning, and language. Hatebase asks users who add
terms to classify the term under one or more of the following
hate categories: archaic, class, disability, ethnicity, gender,
nationality, religion, and sexual orientation (SexOrient). We
use Hatebase as a lexical resource to retrieve English hate
terms, broken down as: 42 archaic terms, 57 class, 7 dis-
ability, 427 ethnicity, 13 gender, 147 nationality-related, 38
religion, and 9 related to sexual orientation. After careful in-
spection and five iterations of keyword scrutiny, we removed
keyphrases that resulted in tweets with uses distinct from
hate speech or phrases that were extremely context sensitive.
For example, the word “pancake” appears in Hatebase, but
clearly can be used in benign contexts. Since our goal was a
high quality dataset, we only included key phrases that were
highly likely to indicate hate speech. The result is 8, 8, 2,
12, 4, 11, 4, and 2 keyphrases for the above, respective, hate
speech classes. Due to the sheer volume of Twitter data, our
main focus is to curate a relevant and accurate hate speech
dataset with minimal amount of noise.
Despite the qualitative inspection of the keyphrases, when
we used the resultant keyphrases to filter tweets from the
1% public stream, non-hate speech tweets remained in our
dataset. To mitigate the effects of obscure contexts and
stance on the filtering process, we were in need of a hate
5Twitter Streaming APIs: https://dev.twitter.com/streaming/overview
6Hatebase: https://www.hatebase.org/
7We refer to hate speech terms as keyphrases, keywords, hate
terms and hate expressions, interchangeably.
speech classifier that could remove non-hate speech tweets.
Consider the following two tweets:
(a): “@usr 1 i’ll tear your limbs apart and feed them to the
f*cking sharks you n*gger”
(b): “@usr 2 what influence?? that you can say n*gger and
get away with it if you say sorry??.
While both of these tweets contain the word “n*gger”, the
first tweet (a) is pro-hate speech where the hate instigator is
attacking usr 1; the second tweet (b) is anti-hate speech in
which the tweet author denounces the comments of usr 2.
Thus stance detection is vital to consider when classifying
hate speech tweets. To mitigate the effects of obscure con-
texts and stance with respect to hate speech on the filtering
process, we used the Perspective API8 developed by Jigsaw
and the Google Counter-Abuse technology team, the model
for which is comprehensively discussed in (Wulczyn, Thain,
and Dixon 2017).9
The Perspective API contains different models of clas-
sification including: toxicity, attack of commenter, inflam-
matory, and obscene, among others. When a request is
sent to the API with specific model parameters, a prob-
ability value [0, 1] is returned for each model type. For
our datasets, we focus on two models: toxicity and
attack on commenter. The toxicity model is a
convolutional neural network trained with word-vector in-
puts. It measures how likely a comment will make people
leave a discussion. The attack on commenter model
measures the probability a comment is an attack on a
fellow commenter and is trained on a New York Times
dataset tagged by their moderation team. After inspect-
ing the toxicity and attack on commenter scores
for the tweets filtered by the Hatebase phrases, we found
that a threshold of 0.8 for toxicity scores and 0.5 for
attack on commenter scores yielded a high quality
dataset.
As a final step to ensure that the resultant tweets attacked
a specific Twitter user, we took the remaining tweets in our
hate dataset and retained only those tweets that both men-
tion another account (@) and that contain second person
pronouns (e.g., “you”, “your”, “u”, “ur”). The use of second
person pronouns has been found to occur with high preva-
lence in directed hostile messages (Spertus 1997). The re-
sult of applying these filters is a high precision hate speech
dataset of 27,330 tweets in which HIs use explicit Hatebase
expressions against HTs. Figure 1 depicts the filtering pro-
cess along with our workflow.
(2) General dataset (Gen-1%): To provide a larger context
for interpretation of our analyses, we compare data from the
HS-1% dataset with a random sample of all general Twitter
accounts. To create this dataset, we use the Twitter Stream-
ing API to obtain a 1% sample of tweets posted per day
within the same 18 month collection window and extract the
union set of users who posted them. We then remove ac-
counts appearing in the HS-1% dataset, and randomly sam-
ple 60K of the remaining users. To mitigate the bias towards
8Conversation AI source code: https://conversationai.github.io/
9We also experimented with classifiers including (Davidson et
al. 2017) but found Perspective API to be empirically better.
Total Unique Users Suspended Deleted
HS Type HI HT HI (%) HT (%) HI (%) HT (%)
Archaic 169 169 8.3 11.2 4.1 4.1
Class 849 837 10.0 7.3 4.9 4.4
Disability 8,044 7,930 11.8 6.7 5.7 4.3
Ethnicity 2,073 2,045 18.8 11.3 6.6 5.2
Gender 13,195 13,340 9.4 5.7 5.6 4.7
Nationality 78 79 9.0 11.4 6.4 3.8
Religion 45 47 13.3 19.1 13.3 2.1
SexOrient 3,638 3,584 15.3 9.0 6.9 6.0
HS-1% 25,278 22,857 12.8 8.3 6.5 5.7
Gen-1% 60,000 5.2 3.2
Table 1: Suspended and deleted accounts for all datasets.
more active users, we sample from the union set of users to
ensure equiprobable selection of all users, regardless of ac-
tivity level. While we try our best to remove all the bias, we
acknowledge the possibility that this set might include some
HIs and HTs. However, later our results show that this bias
is likely to have have little impact because we observe sig-
nificant differences between characteristics of HIs and HTs
compared to the general dataset.
Table 1 shows the number of users in each of our datasets.
In total, our dataset includes 25,278 hate instigators and
22,857 targets. The table shows the quantity of hate tweets
for different hate classes.
The number of keywords used for identifying each class
of hate can have an impact on the number of detected HIs
and HTs. However, we observe that some classes with fewer
keywords, such as gender, disability and sexual orientation,
with 4, 2 and 2 keywords, have a higher contribution to our
dataset, with 52%, 32% and 14% of HIs. This shows the
prevalence of these hate keywords on Twitter.
Table 1 also shows the percentages of suspended and
deleted accounts. The Twitter API returns an error message
when the user account is suspended or the user is not found.
According to Twitter, account suspensions occur when the
account is spam, its security is at risk, or it is engaged in abu-
sive tweets or behaviors. Twitter accounts that are not found
(deleted) occur when the user does not exist. This error could
arise for a variety of reasons: the user deactivated their ac-
count, the account was permanently deleted after thirty days
of deactivation, etc. We label users that no longer exist as
deleted. On average, suspended accounts comprise 12.8%
of instigators, 8.3% of targets, and 5.2% of general Twit-
ter users. Additionally, on average, deleted accounts com-
prise 6.5% of instigators, 5.7% of targets, and 3.2% of gen-
eral Twitter accounts. Our findings show that instigators and
targets are more likely to have their accounts suspended or
deleted than general Twitter users, with instigators as the
most likely.
Across each hate class, approximately 5% of accounts are
deleted. The only exception is the Religion class, where 13%
of hate instigator accounts are deleted. However, this may be
the result of the small sample from this class. Interestingly,
it seems Twitter is more successful in detecting hate related
to Ethnicity, SexOrient and Religion as these categories have
the highest number of suspended instigator accounts.
Many account holders in HS-1% either post more than
one hateful tweet, or are hate targets more than once. Fur-
ther, we identify 2,077 (approximately 5%) accounts that are
both hate instigators and targets. Figure 2a illustrates the log-
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Figure 2: Frequency of hate tweets in HS-1%.
arithmic histogram for the number of hate tweets posted by
each instigator account. In our HS-1% dataset, about 10%
of instigator accounts have posted more than one hate tweet.
Figure 2b illustrates the histogram representing the number
of hate tweets against other accounts. Approximately 11% of
accounts are mentioned in more than two tweets, while two
specific accounts are mentioned in 449 and 210 hate tweets.
Human-centered dataset evaluation. We evaluate the
quality of our final dataset by incorporating human judgment
using Crowdflower. We provided annotators with a class bal-
anced random sample of 1000 tweets.10 To aid annotation,
all annotators were provided a set of precise instructions.
This included the definition of hate speech according to the
social media community (Facebook and Twitter) and ex-
amples of hate tweets selected from each of our eight hate
speech categories. Then, for each tweet, we asked annota-
tors two questions: (1) whether the tweet is hate speech, and
(2) whether the tweet is a direct attack towards the account
mentioned in the tweet. To improve the quality of responses,
before assigning a task to annotators, we asked them five test
questions with already known responses. If they could not
answer at least 80% of these questions correctly, we identi-
fied them as unreliable annotators and removed them from
the task. Each tweet was labeled by at least three indepen-
dent Crowdflower annotators.
Using the majority vote, we found that annotators labeled
97.8% of the tweets as hate speech and 94.3% of tweets as
an attack towards the mentioned account. We then evaluated
the inter-annotator reliability by measuring the agreement
percentage of annotators for each of the questions. We found
that the agreement percentage for the first question is 92.8%,
and for second question is 82.6%. These results shows that
our hate speech dataset is reliable with minimal noise.
Measures
We adopt several measures based on prior work to answer
our research questions. To compare the account character-
istics of HIs and HTs, we investigate whether users have a
profile image, set a geo-location and a timezone, whether
the account is verified, and the length of the profile descrip-
tion. We study the number of tweets and retweets, friends,
followers, and whether the account is enlisted. Similar to
Nilizadeh et al. (Nilizadeh et al. 2016), we differentiate ac-
counts by perceived, as opposed to actual, user character-
istics. This is because we can only study how an account
10We used a random sample of 1000 tweets to keep the monetary
cost manageable.
Gen-1% users HIs HTs
Statistic Mean Min Max Median Mean Min Max Median Mean Min Max Median
Followers count 932 0 4,589,177 93 1,358 0 1,006,790 259 229,676 0 102,008,153 857
Friends count 408 0 243,937 160 663 0 1,012,412 239 1,897 0 1,698,640 396
Tweets count 4,384 0 570,550 545 14,160 0 4,321,652 3,266 29,559 1 3,644,240 10,902
Listed count 8 0 10,118 0 13 0 7,855 2 755 0 616,271 9
Retweet counts 3 0 13,220 0 30 0 27,390 2 623 0 304,900 10
Account age (years) 3.73 0.09 10.99 3.33 3.67 0.09 10.66 3.22 4.40 0.09 11.37 4.16
len. description (chars) 45 0 164 28 53 0 164 37 63 0 164 49
Profile image 0.95 0 1 NA 0.97 0 1 NA 0.99 0 1 NA
Profile URL 0.23 0 1 NA 0.24 0 1 NA 0.40 0 1 NA
Geo location 0.33 0 1 NA 0.39 0 1 NA 0.51 0 1 NA
Location 0.53 0 1 NA 0.61 0 1 NA 0.69 0 1 NA
Timezone 0.40 0 1 NA 0.52 0 1 NA 0.68 0 1 NA
Verified 0.003 0 1 NA 0.002 0 1 NA 0.12 0 1 NA
N = 60, 000 N = 25, 278 N = 22, 857
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of our datasets.
holder chooses to represent him/herself, i.e., through a pro-
file photo, and cannot determine their actual characteristics.
We predict user gender by extracting first names and com-
paring them with those listed in the 1900 – 2013 U.S. Cen-
sus (Mislove et al. 2011; Nilizadeh et al. 2016). We leverage
the IBM Watson Personality Insights API (Watson 2015) to
quantify the Big Five personality traits for HIs and HTs. The
API has been used in prior studies to correlate personality
traits with information-spreading (Lee et al. 2014) and tar-
geted advertising (Chen et al. 2015).
Analysis
RQ1: Account Characteristics
Our first objective is to understand the differences of self
presentation through profile configurations, activity level,
and interaction with other users. To study profile presenta-
tion, we analyze whether profile image, location, and time-
zone are provided by the user; whether the user has en-
abled the geo-location to be posted along with their tweets;
whether the account is verified by Twitter; and the length
of profile description in characters. For user activity level,
we analyze number of tweets, friends, followers, lists, and
retweets. The last three of these indicate how Twitter users
interact with an account and are used as visibility mea-
sures (Nilizadeh et al. 2016; Sharma et al. 2012).
All characteristics can be extracted from the meta-data
provided with the tweets, except the retweet count. For ev-
ery user, we count the number of times the user’s tweets are
reposted in our 1% dataset. Although the obtained retweet
counts only represent a subset of the actual retweets, they
provide useful insight when comparing different samples.
We determine the gender of users by extracting first
names and comparing them with first names listed in the
U.S. Census dataset obtained from 1900 – 2013 (Mislove
et al. 2011). Some first names are gender-neutral, such as
“Pat.” Similar to other work (Mislove et al. 2011), if a name
has a female-to-male ratio larger than 0.95 or smaller than
0.05, we label it as female or male; other names are labeled
as ‘gender ambiguous’. We are able to extract first names
for 53% of HIs, 55% of HTs and 56% of general users. HIs
use pseudonyms more than others, which can be an indica-
tion of desire to hide their identities. 25%, 23% and 8% of
users in the Gen-1% dataset; 35%, 10% and 8% of users in
the instigator dataset; and 35%, 12% and 8% of users in the
instigator dataset are male, female and gender ambiguous,
respectively. Instigator and target datasets include 10% more
male and 13% fewer female users than the Gen-1% dataset,
which implies that users with female account names are less
engaged in hate discussions.
Table 2 statistically describes the users in our Gen-1%
and HS-1% datasets. Since the distribution of most char-
acteristics is skewed, in addition to mean, the table also
shows the min, max and median of values. The table illus-
trates multiple differences between user types. The t-tests
for account age (by year) suggest that, on average, the ac-
counts for HTs are older than those of HIs (µ = 4.40, vs.
µ = 3.67) (t = 32.18, p < 0.001) and generic random users
(µ = 4.40, vs. µ = 3.73) (t = 32.91, p < 0.001). Also,
the accounts for HIs are younger than those of general ran-
dom users (µ = 3.67 vs. µ = 3.73) (t = 3.33, p < 0.001).
We observe that compared to random users, HIs and HTs are
more active in becoming friends with others, posting tweets,
and providing more content on their profiles.
The t-tests for profile description length (in characters)
show that, on average, the descriptions provided by HTs are
longer than those for HIs (µ = 63, vs. µ = 53) (t = 20.14,
p < 0.001). The descriptions provided by hate targets and
instigators are longer than those of generic random users
(µ = 63, vs. µ = 45) (t = 40.04, p < 0.001), (µ = 53,
vs. µ = 45) (t = 19.56, p < 0.001). These results may
suggest that both HIs and HTs are more willing to present
themselves.
Table 3 shows the results of Chi-square tests for the bi-
nary variables. In general, HTs reveal more information on
their profiles; they are more likely to add image, URL, loca-
tion and timezone to their profiles compared to both HIs and
general Twitter users. There is only one exception where the
difference between the distribution of geo-location for HIs
and that of HTs is not significant (p = 0.06).
Twitter verifies accounts that are of public interest. When
accounts are verified, a blue badge appears next to the user’s
name on their profile.11 Interestingly, when comparing HIs
and HTs, we observe that HTs include significantly more
high profile and established users; 12% belong to verified
11Request to verify an account:
https://support.twitter.com/articles/119135#
HT vs. HI Gen-1% vs. HT Gen-1% vs. HI
df X2 p X2 p X2 p
Profile image 1 7633 *** 672 *** 4901 ***
Profile URL 1 325 *** 1858 *** 3546 ***
Geo location 1 3.53 0.06 1937 *** 1801 ***
Location 1 1606 *** 1389 *** 66 ***
Timezone 1 1389 *** 4444 *** 797 ***
Verified 1 99 *** 6226 *** 4789 ***
Gender (name) 1 1318 *** 1230 *** 21 ***
Invalid image 1 2,088,900 *** 1,221 *** 4,827,400 ***
Detected face 1 1,138,200 *** 505 *** 1,821,700 ***
Multiple faces 1 282,530 *** 127 *** 368,000 ***
One face (Male) 1 289,160 *** 24,493 *** 224,900 ***
One face (Female) 1 270,580 *** 197,900 *** 933,780 ***
Note: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Table 3: Pearson’s Chi square tests.
U (HT vs. HI) U (Gen-1% vs. HT) U (Gen-1% vs. HI) p
Followers 321,900K 183,400K 504,620K ***
Tweets 294,930K 190,920K 445,380K ***
Friends 278,670K 316,970K 586,540K ***
Lists 305,450K 221,840K 503,890K ***
Retweets 304,560K 139,270K 369,650K ***
Table 4: Mann-Whitney U tests.
accounts. However, HIs themselves are less likely to have
verified accounts, even compared to random general users.
Next, we examine the activity and visibility levels of ac-
count holders. We compare these variables by using Mann-
Whitney U tests, because they do not follow a normal distri-
bution. These results are provided in Table 4. Interestingly,
HTs have more friends and post more tweets than both HIs
and general users. They also have higher visibility and in-
fluence; their median numbers of followers and retweets are
larger than those of both HIs and general users.
Twitter’s ‘List’ feature allows users to organize others by
creating topical user lists. If some users are known for some-
thing, e.g., are computer scientists, then they might be listed
by others in “Computer Scientists” list. Organizing Twitter
users into lists helps track tweets from those in the list. Our
results show that targets of hate are listed more often.
Figure 3 compares the distribution of the activity and vis-
ibility characteristics of HIs and HTs with those from the
Gen-1% dataset. This figure shows CCDF plots for variables
that exhibit heavy-tailed distributions. Figure 3a shows that
HTs on average have more followers than both HIs and gen-
eral Twitter users, while the distribution of followers count
for HIs is more similar to that of general Twitter users.
Specifically, the difference between HTs and others is more
significant for visibility measures including followers, lists
and retweet counts.
Visibility: We next examine the visibility of HIs and
HTs by controlling for variables that can have an impact on
the visibility measures. For example, older accounts have
had more time to accumulate followers; following many
others usually yields more followers by sheer reciprocity;
and posting many tweets can increase the chances to be
noticed. Thus, we incorporate the following control vari-
ables in our models: account age, number of tweets, num-
ber of friends, and profile characteristics such as URL, lo-
cation, image, length of user description, timezone and ver-
Followers count
Poisson 0.25 Qrt. 0.5 Qrt. 0.75 Qrt. 1.00 Qrt.
HT 2.68∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 2.36∗∗∗
IRRs 14.64 1.51 1.11 1.05 10.60
Lists count
HT 1.93∗∗∗ 0.04 0.08∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 1.59∗∗∗
IRRs 6.92 1.036 1.08 1.06 4.92
Retweet count
HT 4.06∗∗∗ 2.57∗∗∗ 4.18∗∗∗ 3.76∗∗∗ 3.35∗∗∗
IRRs 57.94 13.00 65.01 42.98 28.53
Table 5: HTs vs. All Poisson Regressions.
Followers count Lists count Retweet count
HT (IRRs) 2.03∗∗∗ (7.65) 1.59∗∗∗ (4.90) 3.15∗∗∗ (23.32)
Table 6: HTs vs. HIs Poisson Regressions.
Followers count Lists count Retweet count
HI (IRRs) 0.46∗∗∗ (1.59) 0.49∗∗∗ (1.62) 1.98∗∗∗ (7.26)
Table 7: HIs vs. Gen-1% Poisson Regressions.
ified, as well as perceived user gender. We control for pro-
file characteristics and gender because user self-presentation
can affect the way people perceive them, and therefore,
can have an impact on visibility measures (Ridgeway 2001;
Nilizadeh et al. 2016).
We select three dependent variables as the main mea-
sures of online visibility on Twitter: ‘number of followers’,
‘retweets,’ and ‘lists.’ We apply multiple multivariate regres-
sion models and present the results from our Poisson regres-
sion model. Linear and negative binomial regression models
show qualitatively consistent results, although a couple did
not converge.
Since our dependent variables exhibit a skewed distribu-
tion, examining the whole population may not capture more
nuanced patterns (Yu, Lu, and Stander 2003). For example,
in Table 2, we observe that a hate target account holder has
more than 100M followers and this user alone can impact
the overall and average statistical results. Thus, we adopt
the quartile regression technique to analyze our dataset in
each quartile. We divide the data into quartiles based on each
dependent variable and apply multivariate regression mod-
els. Although we include control variables in all models, for
brevity, we omit them from the result tables; full tables are
available upon request. We add followers count as a control
for the retweets and lists count models because more follow-
ers may result in being retweeted and listed more. We add
lists count as a control for the retweets count model because
being listed by many people may result in being retweeted
more. We report Incident Rate Ratios (IRRs), the exponen-
tiated coefficients of Poisson regressions, which allow us to
compare the rates of variables between HIs, HTs, and gen-
eral users.
Table 5 shows the results of Poisson regression compar-
ing HTs vs. the union of HIs and general users. The first
column shows the result for the entire sample such that HTs
have significantly more followers, are listed and retweeted
more than all other users (p < 0.001). Particularly, for fol-
(a) Followers count (b) Friends count (c) Listed count (d) Retweets count (e) Tweets count
Figure 3: Comparison of account characteristics of HIs, HTs, and general users.
lowers, lists and retweet counts, the HTs have IRRs 14.64,
6.92 and 57.94 times of those of the union of HIs and gen-
eral users. Table 6 illustrates that these findings hold even
when HTs are compared only with HIs (p < 0.001). These
results suggest that regardless of user activity level, pro-
file self-presentation, and gender, more visible Twitter users
(with more followers, lists, and retweets) are more likely to
become target of hate.
Table 7 demonstrates the results of models for HIs vs.
general users. The coefficients for both overall and quartiles
models are positive and larger than one, which indicate that
HIs are positively associated with being visible.
In Table 5, quartile regression reveals that the overall and
average results are not just the effects of most visible users,
and in each quartile, the HTs are more visible than HIs and
general users. Although the effect of HTs (IRR) increases as
one moves from the least visible to most visible users, in al-
most all quartiles values are larger than one. For brevity, we
do not report the results of models per quartiles in Tables 6
and 7 although the interpretation of their results is consistent
with those reported for Table 5.
Comparing the IRR results with those in Tables 5 and 6
shows that the differences between the HTs and HIs are sig-
nificantly higher than those of HIs and general users. These
results also suggest that participating in hate speech and
being more visible and popular are related; even when con-
trolling for all mentioned independent variables, both HIs
and HTs are more popular and visible than general users.
RQ2: Personality Traits
To study the key differences between the personalities of
HIs, HTs, and the general population, we use the Twitter
REST API to fetch tweet traces of users. A Twitter user can
share content on their profile in three different ways: an orig-
inal tweet, a reply to a tweet written by another user, or a re-
distribution of a tweet written by another account (retweet-
ing). Retweets do not necessarily indicate content endorse-
ment but suggest content to be viewed by the retweeter’s net-
work. Since retweeting content might not reflect the author’s
point of view, we only include original tweets and replies as
part of our personality analysis. We attempt to fetch the most
recent 2000 tweets (excluding retweets) for each account.
We use IBM Watson Personality Insights API12 for our per-
sonality analysis. Since the Personality Insights API requires
a minimum of 600 words to obtain statistically significant
result estimates, we discard any accounts that do not satisfy
this requirement. After discarding suspended and deleted ac-
counts, accounts with statistical insignificance, and accounts
with languages other than English, we were able to fetch
tweets for a total of 17,951 unique HIs, 17,553 unique HTs,
and 12,900 unique general users (pulled from Gen-1%).13
We use the general users personality results as a means of
account sample representation on Twitter. The word count
distribution is (µ = 11, 045.6, σ = 7, 230.5) for HI ac-
counts, (µ = 12, 316.1, σ = 7, 308.7) for HT accounts, and
(µ = 8, 108.2, σ = 7, 288.7) for accounts in Gen-1%.
The IBM Watson Personality API infers personality char-
acteristics from textual information based on an open-
vocabulary approach (Docs 2015b). The API’s machine
learning algorithm is trained using scores obtained from sur-
veys conducted among thousands of users along with data
from their Twitter feeds. The API provides scores [0, 1] that
reflect the normalized percentile score for the characteristic.
We analyze the results of the Big Five personality model,
the most widely used model for generally describing how
a person engages with the world. The model includes five
primary dimensions: Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Ex-
traversion, Emotional range, and Openness. The Big Five
personality traits, their associated facets, and how to inter-
pret them are defined in detail in (Docs 2015a).
To quantify the difference between the continuous
distributions of different personality aspects, we compute
the Hellinger distance (Tanton 2005). The Hellinger dis-
tance between two measures P and Q represented by two
distributions f(x) and g(x), respectively, is defined as:
H(P,Q) =
√
1
2
∫
(
√
f(x)−
√
g(x) )2 dx , (1)
where H(P,Q) ∈ [0, 1]. The minimum distance of 0 is
achieved when P and Q exhibit exactly the same distribu-
tions; the maximum distance of 1 is achieved when P as-
signs probability zero to every set to which Q assigns a pos-
12https://www.ibm.com/watson/services/personality-insights/
13All sampling errors in our results are less than 0.1.
Medians HI vs. HT HI vs. Gen-1% HT vs. Gen-1% Hellinger distances
Personality facet HI HT Gen-1% U p U p U p HI-HT HI-Gen-1% HT-Gen-1%
Agreeableness 0.06 0.1 0.4 134,790K *** 47,512K *** 61,130K *** 0.11 0.37 0.27
Openness 0.49 0.51 0.5 152,400K *** 114,760K 0.18 115,840K *** 0.03 0.03 0.04
Emotional range 0.18 0.22 0.38 142,360K *** 77,917K *** 87,490K *** 0.08 0.22 0.15
Conscientiousness 0.02 0.05 0.31 128,370K *** 35,667K *** 55,020K *** 0.18 0.46 0.31
Extraversion 0.23 0.31 0.47 149,410K *** 83,693K *** 88,067K *** 0.04 0.17 0.13
Note: *p < 0.05 **< 0.01 ***< 0.001
Table 8: Scores and Hellinger distances for the Big Five personality traits of HIs, HTs and general users.
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Figure 4: Distribution of scores for the Big Five personality traits.
itive probability, and vice versa. Table 8 depicts the pairwise
distribution distances between HIs and HTs (HI-HT), and
the distance between the HI and HT distributions and the
general users, (HI-Gen-1%) and (HT-Gen-1%), respectively.
We also report the results of the Mann-Whitney U tests.
HIs and HTs personalities differ from general users: For
all the personality traits depicted in Table 8, the Hellinger
distance of (HI-HT) is always less than or equal to (HI-Gen-
1%) and (HT-Gen-1%). This indicates that HIs and HTs have
more similar personalities to each other than general users.
This is also shown for each personality trait’s median. With
the exception of Openness, the median for HIs personality
facets is closer to the median of HTs than Gen-1%.
Both HIs and HTs exhibit lower Agreeableness than gen-
eral users. Lower Agreeableness scores are often associated
with suspicious and antagonistic behaviors (Toegel and Bar-
soux 2012). Our results indicate that HIs and HTs are more
self-focused, contrary, proud, cautious of others, and can
compromise morality.
While Figure 4 shows that the distributions for HIs, HTs,
and general users are close (with a median of approximately
0.5), when we investigate Openness, we find discrepancies
in the lower level facets: Adventurousness, Emotionality,
and Imagination. Both HIs and HTs exhibit lower scores
for Emotionality and Adventurousness, and higher Imagi-
nation scores, in comparison to the general users. Moreover,
HIs and HTs have similar distributions for Artistic Interests
(p = 0.24) and Liberalism (p = 0.98). These results indicate
that HIs and HTs are less emotionally aware and less adven-
turous with a wild imagination (lower preference to facts),
and more authority challenging behavior, in comparison to
the general users.
For Emotional range, HIs and HTs have lower scores
than general users across all facets. HIs have slightly lower
scores, but still statistically significant, than HTs. The high
Emotional range scores indicate that HIs and HTs are more
fiery, prone-to worry, melancholy, hedonistic, and suscepti-
ble to stress. Cheng et al. observe that negative mood in-
creased a user’s probability to engage in trolling, and that
anger begets more anger (Cheng et al. 2017). It seems that
Emotional range facets such as Anxiety, Depression, Im-
moderation, and Self-consciousness are embodied more in
the tweets of HIs and HTs but further work is needed to di-
rectly correlate these parameters with hate speech and online
trolling.
For Conscientiousness, HIs and HTs generally have lower
scores than general users. Consistently, HTs score slightly
higher, but still statistically significant, than HIs. Our results
suggest that HIs and HTs tend to disregard rules and obli-
gations, as indicated by low dutifulness scores, and would
rather take action immediately than spend time deliberat-
ing a decision, as indicated by low Cautiousness scores. As
for Extraversion, HIs and HTs tend to have lower scores
of Activity-level, Friendliness, and Cheerfulness but higher
scores for Excitement seeking, in comparison to general
users. Our results indicate that HIs and HTs are inclined to
be less sociable, less assertive, and more solemn.
HIs and HTs tend to share personality facets: It is pos-
sible that the personality facets for HIs and HTs could con-
tribute to the problem of hate speech. Our results show that
indeed the personalities of HIs and HTs are much closer to
each other than to the general users. Moreover, our results
agree with prior work conducted for victims of bullying.
Prior studies, in workplaces and schools, have shown that
bullying victims tend to show depression and helplessness
as a result of bullying (Price et al. 1994). Moreover victims
are described as lacking social skills, tending to show emo-
tions, e.g., crying easily (Schwartz, Dodge, and Coie 1993),
and are likely to experience anxiety, loneliness, and hyper-
activity (Camodeca et al. 2003; Johnson et al. 2002). Our
work also agrees with studies that show that bullies and
victims share a wide range of bully-typifying personality
traits such as machiavellianism, narcissism, psychoticism,
and aggression, and that bullies and victims could exchange
roles (Linton and Power 2013). Interestingly, in this work
we have shown that these personality signals have been mir-
rored from the physical world and now have a presence in
the digital world as well.
Discussion and Conclusion
Hate mitigation and counter speech. Successful counter
speech is a direct response to hateful comments aimed
at influencing discourse and behavior (Benesch 2014; Be-
nesch et al. 2016). Recently, Munger showed that counter
speech using automated bots can reduce instances of racist
speech if instigators are sanctioned by a high-follower white
male (Munger 2017). If AI-powered counter speech bots are
widely deployed (Forbes 2017), a research challenge would
then be how we can design these bots to achieve maximum
impact. Prior work has shown that people respond more
positively to messages tailored to their personality (Hirsh,
Kang, and Bodenhausen 2012). For instance, Myszkowski
and Storme correlated Openness with product design and
found that individuals with low openness scores respond
to product appearance and, conversely, high openness in-
dividuals tend to focus on product aspects (Myszkowski
and Storme 2012). Our personality analyses could be used
to design next generation counter speech bots of increased
effectiveness. Moreover, our personality results show that
50% of HIs and HTs score above 0.53 for the Openness
to change personality facet, which may imply that counter
speech could be successfully used to decrease hate speech.
Profile-based data collection. Most common methods of
data collection use hate terms and trained classifiers to clas-
sify new content as hateful or benign. Another method em-
ploys bootstrapping, which is used in (Xiang et al. 2012) to
obtain training data by classifying Twitter accounts as ei-
ther “good” or “bad” based on usage of offensive terms. All
tweets from “bad accounts” are marked as hate speech in-
stances. Our results could be incorporated through the use
of personality scores as features to classify users. Alterna-
tively, a user could be represented as a vector of person-
ality facets and then compared to values for hate speech
accounts. This could be especially useful for content cu-
ration for cases when the instigator is likely to engage in
hate speech more than once (Xiang et al. 2012; Chatzakou
et al. 2017b) or as features for early instigator identifica-
tion (Cheng, Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil, and Leskovec 2015)
and implicit hate speech detection.
Critique of methodology and limitations. There are lim-
itations to our methodology and findings. Recent stud-
ies (Tufekci 2014; Morstatter et al. 2013) discuss common
issues associated with social media analysis and the sam-
ple quality of the Twitter Streaming API. Our analysis fo-
cused on explicit hate speech and relied on keyword-based
methods, which have been shown to miss instances of hate-
ful speech (Saleem et al. 2016). However, while we cannot
claim to have captured a complete representation of hate
speech on Twitter, as our starting point for tweet filtering
was based on a set of hate terms from Hatebase, our primary
objective was to investigate hate speech instigator and target
accounts with a high precision dataset. We believe that our
careful curation methodology achieved this end goal.
Conclusion. We have presented the first comparative study
of hate speech instigators, targets, and general Twitter users.
We have outlined a semi-automated classification approach
for curation of directed explicit hate speech. Our analysis
yields a number of interesting and unexpected findings about
actors of hate speech. For example, we found that hate in-
stigators target more visible users and that participating in
hate commentary is associated with higher visibility. We
also showed that hate instigators and targets have unique
personality characteristics that may contribute to hate speech
such as anger, depression, and immoderation. We hope that
our results can be used as meta-information to improve hate
speech classification, detection and mitigation to combat this
increasingly pervasive problem.
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